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COMMENT
Transnational Carbon-Trading Standards:
Improving the Transparency and
Coordination of Post-Kyoto Carbon Trading
Markets
BRADEN SMITH

I.

INTRODUCTION

Carbon trading markets are operating or in development in
the European Union (EU Emission Trading Scheme), Australia,
New Zealand, Tokyo, Japan, and through regional initiatives in
the United States.
However, problems regarding the
transparency of tradable carbon credits or offsets, especially the
transnational monitoring of compliance with carbon emission
limits established through national permits, have slowed the
implementation of these initiatives. 1 Given the large question
marks that still hover over the Kyoto Protocol’s legally binding
commitments,2 and given the gridlock that plagues the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
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Amb. Robert V an Lierop, and Ann Powers for their advice and thoughts on
issues related to this Comment. I would also like to thank the PACE
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW editors and associates who provided invaluable
feedback throughout the process, my classmates in both Pace’s U.N.
Environmental Diplomacy Practicum and Eco-Markets seminar who sparked
such interesting discussions, and Audie Klotz for her constant encouragement. I
would not have been able to finish this project without the incredible support
and unending patience of my wife Rachel.
1. See Henrik Hasselknippe, Systems for carbon trading: an overview, 3
CLIMATE POL’Y S43, S44 (2003).
2. See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change art. 3, para. 1, Dec. 11, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 148 [hereinafter
Kyoto Protocol].
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process, there is currently no internationally accepted method on
how to monitor or verify emissions reductions that would allow
carbon trading between distinct international markets. 3 Given
the slow progress of UNFCCC negotiations, an alternative
approach may be to develop a transnational auditing standard
that would allow participating members to adopt uniform
standards for credits and offsets that would be both transparent
to investors and enforceable.4
This Comment will provide a brief survey of the regulatory
frameworks adopted by regional carbon trading markets to
monitor, report, and verify (MRV) carbon emissions. It will then
examine whether existing MRV regulations are sufficient to allow
inter-regional cooperation between carbon trading markets, in
particular, whether the MRV procedures are sufficient to allow
the interchangeable carbon credits and offsets envisioned by the
Kyoto Protocol.5 After reviewing the difficulties associated with
creating harmonized MRV procedures in the absence of clearly
delineated legal commitments in the Kyoto Protocol, the
Comment will suggest how transnational environmental auditing
standards might provide a temporary solution that will facilitate
greater harmonization between regional markets in the absence
of legally binding commitments from Annex I states.
II.

BACKGROUND

The UNFCCC’s Kyoto Protocol mandated that member states
develop and implement monitoring, verification, and compliance
measures that would allow the development of carbon trading
markets.6 The vision of the Kyoto Protocol was to regulate carbon
markets across national boundaries using the annual Conference

3. See Radoslav S. Dimitrov, Inside Copenhagen: The State of Climate
Governance, 10 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 18 (2010).
4. See Paula C. Murray, International Environmental Management
Standard, ISO 14000: A Non-Tariff Barrier or a Step to an Emerging Global
Environmental Policy, 18 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 577 (1997).
5. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 2, at art. 17; United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change, Oct 29-Nov. 10, 2001, Marrakesh, Morocco, 7th
Sess., Report of the Conference of the Parties,
50, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.2 (Jan. 21, 2002) [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol Modalities,
rules and guidelines].
6. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 2, at art. 17.
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of Parties (COP) to set the rules and standards for each market. 7
A single, coherent regulatory framework would allow the
components of the Kyoto Protocol, such as the Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI) projects, to
work in tandem with international emissions trading markets in
each country or region.8 A project funded under the CDM, such
as setting aside 5,000 acres of rainforest in Brazil for
conservation, could then be verified as either a carbon credit or
an offset and traded to an Annex I country to allow a more
efficient allocation of market resources.9
The development of international carbon trading markets
has made slow progress since 1997, but current discussions have
become bogged down in finger-pointing between Annex I states,
and the rapidly growing non-Annex I developing countries, such
as China, India, and Brazil.10 Despite technical developments in
MRV procedures taking place in the UNFCCC’s Subsidiary Body
for Scientific and Technical Advice (SBSTA), the commitment of
Kyoto parties to participating in international trading of carbon
credits has waned. A tentative agreement at the seventeenth
meeting of the UNFCCC’s Conference of Parties in Durban (COP
17) to continue the Kyoto legally binding commitments beyond
2012 will depend on negotiators being able to bridge the gap
between Annex I and non-Annex I parties.11
Although carbon trading within the Kyoto Protocol appears
to be stalled, carbon trading markets continue to develop
regionally. The European Union’s Emissions Trading Scheme
(ETS), launched in 2005, includes a formalized auditing process,
7. Id. at art. 3, para. 4.
8. Edwin Woerdman, Implementing the Kyoto protocol: why JI and CDM
show more promise than international emissions trading, 28 ENERGY POL’Y 1, 2930 (2000).
9. Id.
10. Gloria Jean Gong, What China wants: China's climate change priorities
in a post-Copenhagen world, 23 GLOBAL CHANGE , PEACE & S EC. 159, 171 (2011).
11. Interviews with climate change negotiators from Pacific Small Island
Developing States (PSIDS). Negotiations to determine the future of legally
binding international commitments will now be carried out under a separate
institutional framework called the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban
Platform for Enhanced Action. United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, Durban, S. Afr., Nov. 28-Dec. 11, 2011, Report of the
Conference of the Parties on its Seventeenth Session, 6, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1 (Mar. 15, 2012).
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an extensive monitoring and verification system, and an active, if
not particularly well-regulated, carbon offset market.12 Australia
has a plan in place for emissions trading to begin in 2012, but
political developments in the country will likely push back
implementation until 2013.13 New Zealand has a functional
carbon market, with a well-regulated monitoring and verification
regime, but has not implemented any emissions caps. 14 There
are plans in Japan to develop a nationwide market, but it
currently remains regional.15
Even within the United States, carbon markets are
developing at a regional level. The Regional Greenhouse Gas
Initiative (RGGI) in the Northeast and Mid-Atlantic includes a
commitment to use carbon trading to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions by 10% by 2020.16 So far, the program is designed to
target emissions from fossil fuel-fired electric power generators,
which is less ambitious than most carbon trading markets. 17
California’s carbon trading scheme is similar, but progress has
been delayed due to logistical problems. 18 The situation in the
United States is even more difficult given the concurrent
authority of the federal government, and the U.S. EPA’s plan to
regulate greenhouse gas emissions through its existing authority
(as a consequence of Massachusetts v. EPA).19
Monitoring and enforcement of a carbon trading market is an
extremely technical process, requiring close cooperation between
12. A. Denny Ellerman & Barbara K. Buchner, The European Union
Emissions Trading Scheme: Origins, Allocation, and Early Results, 1 REV .
ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 66, 67-69 (2007).
13. Regina Betz & Anthony D. Owen, The implications of Australia’s carbon
pollution reduction scheme for its National Electricity Market, 38 ENERGY POL’Y
4966 (2010).
14. Slobodan Perdan & Adisa Azapagic, Carbon trading: Current schemes
and future developments, 39 ENERGY POL’Y 6040, 6045-46 (2011).
15. Id. at 6046-47.
16. Richard B. Stewart, States and Cities As Actors in Global Climate
Regulation: Unitary vs. Plural Architectures, 50 A RIZ. L. REV . 681 (2008).
17. Perdan & Azapagic, supra note 14, at 6044-45.
18. Cal. EPA Air Res. Bd., Cap and Trade Program, CA.GOV ,
http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/capandtrade.htm (last visited Sept. 30,
2012).
19. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 532 (2007) (establishing EPA
authority to regulate greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act); Jody Freeman
& Adrian V ermeule, Massachusetts V EPA: From Politics to Expertise, 2007 S UP.
CT. R EV . 51, 72 (2007).
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public and private sectors. Even Annex I developed countries are
having difficulty establishing robust monitoring and enforcement
regimes, and those states that have implemented carbon trading
markets are finding that without transparency between
investors, emitters, and carbon brokers, actual emissions as
credited may not reflect the real reduction of emissions.20 The
EPA’s roll-out of its emissions monitoring regulations provide a
good example of the technical problems associated with
monitoring emitters on an annual basis. It calls for annual
submissions of greenhouse emissions, but so far the age ncy has
refused to bring enforcement actions against emission sources
that declined to submit a 2011 report.21 Although some high-tech
solutions are being developed, like monitoring from satellites, it
remains very difficult for third parties to monitor changes in
emissions.22 Interested third parties, such as brokers looking for
offsets in developing countries, are often at the mercy of
voluntary or non-existent domestic regulations. Rainforests that
are accounted for on a company’s books may not be conserved
long enough to qualify as an offset.
Properly regulated tradable emissions credits are the life blood of a successful market-based approach to reducing
greenhouse gas emissions. The credit is an artificial construct
created by market regulators to transform amorphous, and often
unrelated, human activities, such as raising livestock or
operating a natural-gas fired power plant, into a single,
comparable commodity.23 Through the work of scientists at the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and the
UNFCCC, an emission unit has become universally defined as

20. Peter Bohm, International Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading—With
Special Reference to the Kyoto Protocol, in EFFICIENCY AND EQUITY OF C LIMATE
CHANGE POLICY (Carlo Carraro ed., 2000).
21. Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases, 74 Fed. Reg. 56,259, 56,37980 (Oct. 30, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 98).
22. Ake Rosenqvist et al., A review of remote sensing technology in support of
the Kyoto Protocol, 6 ENVTL. S CI. & POL’Y 441, 441 (2003).
23. Some have described it as a currency. The difference might seem slight,
but its implications are important for how regulators decide to treat market
activity. For the purposes of this paper, carbon credits will be treated as a
commodity, albeit, a heavily regulated one. See Jillian Button, Note, Carbon:
Commodity or Currency? The Case for an International Carbon Market Based on
the Currency Model, 32 HARV . ENVTL. L. REV . 571 (2008).
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one ton of a CO 2 equivalent greenhouse gas.24 Like any
commodity, certain important differences are lost during the
standardization process. For example, methane has other
features that make it a potentially more problematic greenhouse
gas, but for the purposes of a tradable scheme, it gets treated as
equivalent to carbon dioxide so that the emission of either gas can
be tradable.25 The Kyoto negotiators could have tried to treat
each gas separately, but proponents of market-based approaches
were strong advocates of a standardized approach, in part
because standardization allows carbon-trading markets to
achieve a greater level of efficiency. 26 Every participating
industry can then calculate its baseline emissions in the form of
CO2 equivalent greenhouse gases, allowing a sheep rancher in
New Zealand to trade its carbon-emitting activity with an airline
operator in London.
Once the market regulator establishes a standardized unit of
measurement, it can then establish a cap. The cap is the total
amount of carbon that can be emitted by regulated industries
during a given year (this could be any time interval, but annual
reporting is the most commonly used method). Various market
regulators have established caps using different methods. For
those countries participating in the Kyoto Protocol, one would
assume that the cap to use would be their country’s legally
binding commitment contained in Annex I. 27 However, for
political reasons, most regulators have adopted caps that
reference Annex I commitments, but with yearly limits that are
deliberately less stringent than would otherwise be required. 28
24. See, e.g., TASK FORCE ON NAT’L GREENHOUSE GAS INVENTORIES ,
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE , R EVISED 1996 IPCC
GUIDELINES FOR NATIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INVENTORIES (1996).
25. Daniel A. Lashof & Dilip R. Ahuja, Relative contributions of greenhouse
gas emissions to global warming, 344 NATURE 529, 529-31 (1990).
26. Leif Gustavsson et al., Project-based greenhouse-gas accounting: guiding
principles with a focus on baselines and additionality, 28 ENERGY POL’Y 935, 936
(2000).
27. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 2, at art. 3.
28. For example, the European Union is operating under a cap that commits
to reducing the region’s GHGs by 20% by 2020. Council Directive 2009/406, 2009
O.J. (L 140) 136, 137 (EC) (decision of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 23 April 2009 on the effort of Member States to reduce their
greenhouse gas emissions to meet the Community’s greenhouse gas emission
reduction commitments up to 2020). In its March 2007 Directive, the Council
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Of the most substantial carbon-trading markets in operation
worldwide, only the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI),
which operates under a Memorandum of Understanding between
Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont, has set
emission reduction targets without any reference to the Kyoto
commitments.29
The cap is then used to produce a tradable credit, which is
typically calculated as a certain share of CO 2 equivalent
greenhouse gases. Shares are then allocated to different emitters
based on either an auction, the historical needs of the industry, or
through a random distribution.30 An emitter must have the
necessary carbon credits in order to emit its annual share of CO 2
equivalent greenhouse gases. If they are short in a given year,
they can purchase additional credits, reduce emissions to the
allowable amount, or pay a penalty. Most markets, especially
those that allocate credits through an auction, will allow
intermediaries, such as brokers, to purchase and trade credits. 31
In an ideal world, brokers improve market liquidity by
allowing emitters to more easily buy and sell credits depending
recognized that this was insufficient, but said that a higher cap of around 30%
would only take place “provided that other developed countries commit
themselves to comparable emission reductions and economically more advanced
developing countries commit themselves to contributing adequately according to
their responsibilities and capabilities.” Id. at 136.
29. The United States was a signatory to the original Kyoto Protocol, and was
instrumental in negotiating the agreed-upon commitments, but withdrew its
intention to ratify in 2001. RGGI is a regional initiative based on an
independently set cap negotiated between the participating state governments.
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative Memorandum of Understanding 2 -3 (Dec.
20, 2005), available at http://www.rggi.org/ docs/mou_final_12_20_05.pdf. New
Jersey’s governor has recently expressed his desire to withdraw from RGGI;
however, state legislators are challenging the governor’s authority to withdraw.
Mireya Navarro, Christie Pulls New Jersey From 10-State Climate Initiative,
N.Y. TIMES , May 27, 2011, at A20.
30. The U.S. EPA provides an excellent handbook that introduces the basic
features of a cap and trade system. EPA OFFICE OF A IR & R ADIATION, EPA430-B03-002, TOOLS OF THE TRADE : A GUIDE TO DESIGNING AND OPERATING A C AP AND
TRADE PROGRAM FOR POLLUTION CONTROL 3.14-3.23 (2003), available at
http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/resource/docs/tools.pdf [hereinafter OFFICE OF
AIR & RADIATION].
31. See, e.g., U.N. ENV ’T PROGRAMME , DIV . OF TECH., INDUS., & ECON., A N
EMERGING M ARKET FOR THE ENVIRONMENT: A GUIDE TO EMISSIONS TRADING 4-8
(2002) [hereinafter DIV . OF TECH., INDUS ., & ECON.].
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on changes in their industry.32 For example, coal-fired power
plant operators saddled with older facilities can calculate whether
investing in new technology would be more cost-effective than
purchasing credits.
A command and control approach,
exemplified by the Clean Air Act’s technology provisions, would
only focus on mandating new technology. 33 A carbon market is
still regulatory, in the sense that it forces market participants to
make decisions based on external factors, but allows emitters
greater flexibility. For international carbon-credit transactions,
brokers play a particularly important role because emitters are
generally reluctant to enter contractual arrangements with other
emitters without a firm commitment that they will receive a
specified amount of credits. Brokers can more easily commit to
purchasing credits created through offsets because at the end of
the year they are not liable if an eventual offset produces less
credits then was originally anticipated.34
In practice, a tradable emissions system, whether
implemented between states or between companies, should
produce an economically efficient outcome for all participating
parties. A company whose average cost of making technological
improvements to reduce carbon emissions is comparatively high
can use a market-based system to buy permits to allow higher
levels of emissions. Likewise, a company whose average cost is
comparatively low can profit by selling credits gained through
emission reductions. If the regulating authority commits to
periodically reducing the overall permitted level of emissions,
significant emission reductions can be achieved without imposing
as high a cost on the average emitter.35
This system works particularly well for greenhouse gas
emissions because the cumulative effect of anthropogenic
warming of Earth’s climate is felt globally, rather than locally.
For example, if a particular emitter of mercury were allowed to
buy permits to emit more mercury in a year than another facility,
32. Paul G. Miclăuş et al., Testing the Efficiency of the European Carbon
Futures Market using Event-Study Methodology, 2 INT’L J. ENERGY & ENV 'T 121,
121 (2008) (modeling the efficiency of futures price-setting in the EU Emission
Trading Scheme).
33. OFFICE OF A IR & R ADIATION, supra note 30, at 2.1-2.5.
34. See DIV . OF TECH., INDUS ., & ECON., supra note 31, at 10.
35. See id. at 36-37.
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a region downwind of that facility would suffer disproportionate
health effects.36 Although that result might be economically
efficient from an emitter’s perspective, the subsequent harm
caused to the downwind community might be considered an
unacceptable trade-off. However, allowing a facility to emit more
CO2 will generally not cause localized, adverse health effects to a
downwind community.37 Of course, this is also one of the primary
reasons why limiting CO 2 emissions is such a difficult public
policy problem. Maintaining a climate suitable for human
habitation and growth is as close to a pure public good as
economics can hypothesize, which makes it all the more difficult
for states to properly assign the costs of regulating such a good.38
Carbon markets achieve greater economic efficiency when
they include a larger number of market participants. 39
Domestically, this is taking place by expanding the number of
industries participating in carbon-trading schemes. For example,
the EU’s ETS began by targeting fossil fuel-fired electrical energy
generators, which are typically easiest to incorporate into a
regulatory scheme because they are likely already being
monitored for other emissions, such as hazardous pollutants. 40
However, non-point sources of carbon emissions, such as
automobiles, agricultural production, and the airline industry
actually emit a greater percentage of the EU’s annual
emissions.41 Since the EU’s ETS was originally designed to
36. See Kris Christen, Perspective: Mercury trading scheme raises concerns,
38 ENVTL. S CI. & TECH. 126A (2004).
37. It is important to note that CO2 is rarely the only gas emitted from an
industrial facility. A tradable emissions scheme may be a good method of
reducing overall emissions, but it cannot substitute for technology- or airquality-based regulations of other harmful pollutants.
38. The two key components of a public good is that it is non-rival, in other
words “each individual’s consumption of such a good leads to no subtractions
from any other individual’s consumption of that good,” and non-excludable. Paul
A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV . ECON. & S TAT.
387, 387 (1954).
39. See V alentina Bosetti et al., Banking Permits: Economic Efficiency and
Distributional Effects 12 (Ctr. for Econ. Policy Research, Working Paper No.
6652, 2008).
40. Council Directive 2003/87, 2003 O.J. (L 275) 32 (EC) (establishing a
scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community
and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC).
41. DIRECTORATE GEN. FOR ENERGY & TRANSPORT, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, EU
ENERGY FIGURES IN 2010 2 (2010).
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eventually meet the Kyoto Protocol’s Annex I commitments for
each European country, skeptics were quick to point out that the
ETS’s limited applicability placed electrical energy generators at
a severe disadvantage.42 If the ETS became the primary
mechanism for complying with Kyoto, the electrical energy
generators (and those industries that depend heavily on
electricity) would be forced to shoulder a disproportionately large
share of the burden.
Thus, since the creation of the ETS, the Commission has
tried to gradually expand the number of participating industries.
This produced a significant amount of controversy when the
Commission included Europe’s air carriers.43 The airline
industry faces intense international competition, and the airlines
argued that the ETS would place them at a disadvantage. New
Zealand appears to have learned a valuable lesson from the EU’s
experience, because its market already encompasses a more
diverse set of market participants, including agricultural farms
and forestry products.44 Yet, even a more diverse mixture of
market participants does not guarantee a market that trades
with enough volume to ensure adequate protections against
unfair market practices. The EU’s system has been criticized for
being notoriously thin, and susceptible to market manipulation. 45
New Zealand’s system is also very thin, with only ninety-six
mandatory participants as of June 2011, although that number
will rise once additional sectors are brought into the system. 46
One of the biggest challenges for carbon trading is the high
transaction costs associated with establishing MRV procedures. 47
Since the thin line between profit and loss in a carbon market
42. Stephen Gardner, EU ETS: The Winners and Losers of EU Carbon
Trading, KLEANINDUSTRIES (Sept. 22, 2008), http://www.kleanindustries.com/s/
environmental_market_Industry_news.asp?ReportID=320988.
43. See M. V ittoria Giugi Carminati, Clean Air & Stormy Skies: The EU-ETS
Imposing Carbon Credit Purchases on United States Airlines, 37 S YRACUSE J.
INT'L L. & COM . 127 (2010).
44. Perdan & Azapagic, supra note 14, at 6045-46.
45. See Marius-Cristian Frunza et al., Missing trader fraud on the emissions
market, 18 J. FIN. C RIME 183 (2011).
46. NEW ZEALAND M INISTRY FOR THE ENV ’T, REPORT ON THE NEW ZEALAND
EMISSION TRADING S CHEME 7 (2011) [hereinafter N.Z. EMISSIONS TRADING
S CHEME ].
47. Robert N. Stavins, What Can We Learn from the Grand Policy
Experiment? SO2 Allowance Trading, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 69 (1998).
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depends on the reliability and long-term trajectory of emissions
by market participants, confidence in the market can only be
developed if each participant can trust that emissions are
properly monitored, verified by an independent agency, and that
any violators are appropriately punished.48 In economics, these
represent classic transaction costs. A carbon market is unlikely
to succeed without a strong, independent regulatory agency
ensuring that each market participant plays by the rules.
Independent regulation by industry will not generate the level of
confidence in emissions reductions necessary for financial brokers
to enter the market and assume a proportion of the liability
associated with trading carbon emission credits.
III.

IMPORTANCE OF MONITORING, REPORTING,
AND VERIFICATION PROCEDURES

Unlike other commodities, carbon credits are not easily
distinguishable physical objects. Creating a credit depends on (1)
the accuracy of the measurement techniques used to determine
the level of emitted CO 2 equivalent greenhouse gases, (2)
recognition by a market regulator that an emitter has
demonstrated an overall change in their level of annual
emissions, (3) independent verification that industry reporting
reflects an actual reduction rather than an accounting gimmick,
and finally, (4) recognition by buyers that an emission-reduction
can be properly credited to the seller. 49 MRV procedures, which
have been widely used in a variety of market-based regulatory
approaches, become vitally important for maintaining the
integrity, transparency, and vitality of carbon-trading markets.50
MRVs can include a variety of different elements, but typically
involve the use of either continuous or on-site monitoring by an
independent agency, electronic records kept by the emitter and
available for auditing at the request of a market regulator,
trained and competent on-site inspectors with the authority to
48. Id. at 79.
49. V erification includes not only appropriate recognition by the market
regulator that a reduction has taken place, but also assurances against fraud or
misrepresentation.
50. John Schakenback et al., Fundamentals of Successful Monitoring,
Reporting, and Verification under a Cap-and-Trade Program, 56 J. A IR & WASTE
M GMT. A SS'N 1576, 1576 (2006).
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extensively review a company’s emission records, and incentives
or penalties with sufficient size to deter any potential fraud or
negligence.51
The U.S. EPA’s NOx Budget Trading Program and its Acid
Rain Program, both market-based tradable emissions schemes,
provide an excellent example of successfully implemented MRVs.
Both programs are built on strong equipment performance
standards, which ensure that monitoring techniques and
technologies are up to the challenge of providing a reliable data
stream.52 That data is stored electronically, and the EPA
provides the emitter with software allowing the reporter to
identify and potentially correct any errors before submitting a
compliance report.53 Emitter self-reporting is then supplemented
with a rigorous random audit and inspection process based on
identifying any statistical anomalies in the emitter’s electronic
records that might suggest fraud or mistake.54 An incentive and
penalty system functions as a supplement to these quality
assurance measures, bringing a larger percentage of the
regulated industry into voluntary compliance. 55 A significant
amount of time is spent collaborating with emitting sources to
determine how to minimize errors and avoid unintended
noncompliance.
High quality MRVs are vital in order to establish confidence
in the value of a credit. Hypothetically, market regulators should
be able to manage the risk and distribution of credits by tweaking
the cap. However, as the EU’s regulators learned, errors in
calculating the cap or significant policy adjustments can cause
massive fluctuations in the value of a credit in the domestic
market.56 When those fluctuations are the result of the market
anticipating or reacting to a regulatory agency’s decision, outside
investors or brokers, which are vital to a successfully operating
system, may conclude that the market is too risky to successfully

51. Id. at 1577.
52. Id. at 1579.
53. Id. at 1580-81.
54. Id. at 1577-78.
55. Id.
56. Regina Betz & Misato Sato, Emissions Trading: Lessons Learnt from the
1st Phase of the EU ETS and Prospects for the 2 nd Phase, 6 CLIMATE POL’Y 351,
352 (2006).
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manage. It may also result in rapid changes in the retail price of
energy, undermining the public’s confidence in the system’s
reliability.57
Although command and control regulatory structures also
emphasize MRVs, the threat of litigation and the absence of any
intrinsic motive to comply other than the avoidance of liability
mean that greater time is often spent investigating and
punishing.58 The difficulty with market-based regulations is that
persistent regulatory noncompliance will not only result in poor
outcomes (increased pollution), but will also undermine
confidence in the value of tradable emissions, thereby
endangering the value of a credit to other market participants. 59
This is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, compliance
appears to be even more important, which places much of the
success or failure of a market in the hands of market regulators.
However, firms that participate want to realize gains from
participating in the market, which should provide an incentive to
maintain the overall integrity of the MRV process.
It may be easy to dismiss MRV procedures as a technical
matter with limited applicability to the design and functioning of
the overall carbon trading system. In a fully integrated, well regulated, harmonized national regulatory structure, MRVs can
be taken for granted. However, the current regulatory landscape
includes a messy combination of national authorities,
international agreements, and private third-party brokers. If the
goal is to create a seamless international market for carbon, and
thus realize the greater efficiencies from international trading,
market participants must be confident that a credit created and
sold in the EU’s ETS is legally recognized as equivalent to a
credit in New Zealand’s ETS. As a pioneer in carbon trading and
an international promoter of emissions trading through the Kyoto
Protocol, the EU has taken the most active approach to promoting

57. Id.
58. See Robert W. Hahn & Robert N. Stavins, Economic Incentives for
Environmental Protection: Integrating Theory and Practice, 82 AM . ECON. REV .
464 (1992).
59. Tseming Yang, The Problem of Maintaining Emission “Caps” In Carbon
Trading Programs Without Federal Government Involvement: A Brief
Examination of the Chicago Climate Exchange and the Northeast Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative, 17 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV . 255, 273 (2006).
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linkages with other carbon markets. 60 In an April 23, 2009
Directive, the EU’s Council and Parliament attempted to promote
linkages by instructing that operators in the EU be given
assurances that carbon credits created pursuant to the Kyoto
Protocol be recognized as valid credits in the EU ETS. 61
However, the Directive acknowledged that “a procedure should be
established” that would exclude credits that did not represent
“real, verifiable, additional[,] and permanent emission reductions
and have clear sustainable development benefits.”62 This
reflected the Council’s concerns that Kyoto’s MRV procedures
were not rigorous enough to meet the EU ETS standards. It also
reflected growing concern that the Kyoto Protocol’s system might
become legally inoperative if an agreement was not reached on
extending the treaty’s legally binding commitments.63
Even within Europe, harmonizing MRV procedures has
proven difficult. Some EU members have extremely well-funded
and technically capable environmental ministries employing
state-of-the-art continuous monitoring of major emitters. Others,
especially the new Eastern European members, do not have the
resources to implement such a sophisticated program. The EU’s
Directive on MRV procedures allows members to employ either a
CEM-type system, or a factor-analysis approach, whereby
emissions are calculated based on an emitter’s activity data in
conjunction with a standard set of factors developed by technical
experts.64 Ideally, the two approaches should yield similar
results. However, a calculation-based approach depends far more
on self-reporting, and can lead to allegations of under-reporting
that undermine the market’s confidence in the system’s integrity,
especially if the national regulatory authority fails to invest in

60. Atle C. Christiansen & Jørgen Wettestad, The EU As Frontrunner on
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading: How Did It Happen and Will the EU
Succeed?, 3 CLIMATE POL’Y 3, 10 (2003).
61. Council Directive 2009/29, 2009 O.J. (L 140) 63 (EC).
62. Id. at 67.
63. Diarmuid Torney & Noriko Fujiwara, National Commitments,
Compliance and the Future of the Kyoto Protocol 2-4 (Ctr. for European Policy
Studies, Working Paper No. 226, 2010).
64. Commission Decision 2007/589, 2007 O.J. (L 229) 1, 11 (EC).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol30/iss1/8

14

2012]

TRANSNATIONAL CARBON-TRADING

339

adequate compliance procedures.65 Since the EU’s ETS depends
on national-level implementation, different standards can
produce regulatory arbitrage and allegations of fraud. 66
IV.

INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES TO
IMPROVING MRV PROCEDURES

Although carbon-market participants might recognize the
need for more transparent, standardized MRV procedures to
facilitate market linkages, there is no agreed-upon approach to
achieve this goal. The following sections will discuss and
evaluate the effectiveness of three ideal-type approaches,
including (1) strengthening the international regulatory
framework, (2) harmonizing national policies through bilateral or
multilateral agreements, and (3) establishing transnational MRV
procedures and auditing processes. No single approach is
sufficient to address the challenge posed by inter-market carbon
trading, but of the three options, a combination of policy
harmonization and establishing internationally recognized,
market-based transnational MRV procedures is likely to provide
the most feasible solution.
A. Strengthening the Kyoto Protocol
In the late 1990s, international consensus appeared to favor
emissions trading that would take place through a comprehensive
international regulatory framework. 67 The Kyoto Protocol
contains an agreed-upon set of technical definitions, rules, and
procedures to allow the trading of carbon credits between
countries. Article 17 provides that member states “define the
relevant principles, modalities, rules and guidelines, in particular
for verification, reporting and accountability for emissions
trading.”68 That vague proscription was later transformed into a

65. John K. Stranlund, James J. Murphy, & John M. Spraggon, An
Experimental Analysis of Compliance in Dynamic Emissions Markets, 62 J.
ENVTL. ECON. & M GMT. 414, 427 (2011).
66. Jon Birger Skjaerseth, EU Emissions Trading: Legitimacy and
Stringency, 20 ENVTL. POL’Y & GOVERNANCE 295, 305 (2010).
67. For a good example of this type of optimism, see Stuart Eizenstat, Stick
with Kyoto: A Sound Start on Global Warming, 77 FOREIGN AFF. 119 (1998).
68. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 2, at art. 17.
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market-based mechanism for the trading of emissions credits,
including Emission Reduction Units (ERU), Certified Emission
Reductions (CER), Assigned Amount Units (AAU), or Removal
Units (RMU).69 Each unit relates to an institutional or financial
mechanism established by the UNFCCC to promote the trading of
emissions between Annex I countries (historically high emitters
that have made legally binding commitments to reduce emissions
on average 5% below 1990 levels by 2012) and between Annex I
countries and non-Annex I countries.70
For example, an ERU is generated by reducing one ton of
CO2 equivalent greenhouse gas emissions by establishing a Joint
Implementation (JI) project 71 with, typically, a non-Annex I
country. To be credited with an ERU, a project must meet the
rules and guidelines established by the JI Supervisory
Committee.72 If the project meets the Supervisory Committee’s
approval, it will be granted a positive determination that verifies
that the project may submit additional documentation proving a
reduction in a certain amount of CO 2 equivalent greenhouse
gases that may be credited to the project’s Annex I partner. So
far, thirty-two positive determinations have been made during
the initial 2008-2012 commitment period under the Kyoto
Protocol.73 In one such project, the Netherlands received a
positive determination for a JI project with the Russian
Federation to reduce the perfluorocarbon (PFC) emissions of a
Russian aluminum smelter by roughly 749,265.0 t of equivalent

69. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Montreal,
Can., Nov. 28-Dec. 10, 2005, Report of the Conference of the Parties Serving as
the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on its first session, 3, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.2, Advance V ersion (Mar. 30, 2006) [hereinafter
UNFCCC RCPSMPKP Adv.]; Kyoto Protocol Modalities, rules and guidelines,
supra note 5.
70. Id.
71. Id. at art. 6.
72. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Montreal,
Can., Nov. 28-Dec. 10, 2005, Report of the Conference of the Parties Serving as
the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on its first session, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.2 (Mar. 30, 2006) [hereinafter UNFCCC
RCPSMPKP].
73. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Annual
Report of the Joint Implementation Supervisory Committee to the Conference of
the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/KP/CMP/2011/4 (Oct. 24, 2011).
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CO2, which once certified, would generate an equal number of
tradable ERUs.74
A similar process exists for the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean
Development Mechanism (CDM). A CDM project typically
involves a capital investment by an Annex I country, such as an
upgrade to mass transportation infrastructure or the provision of
low-cost energy alternatives in rural areas. 75 CDMs have been
far more popular than JIs, in part because they function more
like traditional foreign aid. Like the JI, the CDM has an
Executive Board mandated to review and approve CDM
projects.76 A state or private investor will design a project,
receive approval for the project from the national government,
validate the project with an approved third-party, register with
the CDM’s Executive Board, receive independent verification of
the extent of the project’s success, and finally, receive an issuance
of a CER from the Executive Board. That CER can then be
traded between states, or on a private carbon trading market. 77
Although much of the action of the Kyoto Protocol has taken
place within the CDM, and to a much smaller extent, the JI, the
foundation of the Protocol rests with the AAUs and RMUs. An
AAU is the assigned amount of permitted greenhouse gas
emissions assessed to each Annex I country in the Kyoto
Protocol.78 If a global carbon trading market between Annex I
countries actually existed, AAUs would be integral to the success
of the Kyoto Protocol’s commitments. RMUs are a bit more
complicated. One RMU is equal to one metric ton of CO 2
equivalent greenhouse gases absorbed by a carbon sink, such as

74. DET NORSKE V ERITAS , DETERMINATION REPORT NO. 2008-1624: REDUCTION
KRASNOYARSK ALUMINUM S MELTER IN R USSIAN
Reduction of perfluorocarbons emissions from
RUSAL Krasnoyarsk Aluminium Smelter, UNFCCC J OINT IMPLEMENTATION
ADVISORY COMM ., http://ji.unfccc.int/JIITLProject/DB/6FU0T3C7WY5XWTR9EM
5JQD5RDV HDSI/details (last visited Oct. 21, 2012).
75. The CDM’s Executive Board maintains a searchable listing of approved
project
activities.
Project
Search,
CLEAN
DEV .
M ECHANISM ,
http://cdm.unfccc.int/Projects/ projsearch.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2012).
76. UNFCCC RCPSMPKP, supra note 72, at 4.
77. See generally CLEAN DEV . M ECHANISM EXEC. B D., S OURCE PROVISIONS OF
THE C LEAN DEVELOPMENT M ECHANISM PROJECT C YCLE PROCEDURE 10 (2011).
78. UNFCCC RCPSMPKP, supra note 72, at 24.
OF PFC EMISSIONS FROM RUSAL
FEDERATION 7-11 (Oct. 22, 2008);
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landfills or carbon capture and storage facilities. 79 Despite
substantial effort to reach agreement on how to measure and
credit RMUs, carbon sinks remain a particularly contentious
issue.80 Developing countries see RMUs as a way for developed
countries to avoid meeting Kyoto commitments. The only carbon
sinks that have been successfully incorporated into a Kyoto
carbon trading unit are those afforestation and reforestation
efforts that have been certified by the CDM’s Executive Board.81
B. Kyoto’s MRV Procedures
The Kyoto Protocol did not attempt to mandate the use of
MRV procedures at the national level. Instead, each tradable
unit was based on a separate MRV procedure. The AAUs, which
were designed to be the principal unit of exchange in a Kyotobased emission trading system, would be calculated from GHG
inventories submitted annually by all Annex I countries. 82 The
reporting requirements largely adopted the methodologies of the
1996 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories,
which required countries to (1) identify sources and sinks
according to a list of categories established by the IPCC, (2)
identify a relevant time-period for the source or sink (such as
three-year average), (3) report each estimate of emissions for the
category in gigagrams, including any uncertainty range, if
applicable, (4) verify the amount with independently published
estimates and against the IPCC’s own reference guidelines, and
(5) document the methodologies, assumptions, and measurements

79. A carbon sink may also involve land use decisions, such as the
preservation of an existing forest otherwise targeted for removal. Crediting
natural carbon sinks is particularly controversial because it seems a lot like
blackmail: I will refrain from destroying my environment if you provide me with
a sufficiently high payoff.
80. See Eric C. Betteheim & Gilonned’ Origny, Carbon Sinks and Emissions
Trading under the Kyoto Protocol: A Legal Analysis, 360 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS
ROYAL S OC’Y 1827 (2002).
81. See CLEAN DEV . M ECHANISM EXEC. BD., PROJECT DESIGN DOCUMENT,
ABERDARE RANGE / M T. KENYA S MALL S CALE REFORESTATION INITIATIVE (Jan. 17,
2011), available at http://cdm.unfccc.int/filestorage/5/H/2/5H2V LI89413SFPXU
QGCJBNE7K6OWYA/PDD_KirimaraKithithina_ver.05?t=MTh8bWJqdDhnfDC
bJzqAklKjOFFBySGRdf8.
82. UNFCCC RCPSMPKP, supra note 72, at 18.
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used to complete the inventory.83 Each inventory report would
then receive an individual review by a technical body of the
secretariat.84 In 2003, following an initial trial period, the eighth
meeting of the conference of the parties (COP 8) agreed to make
submissions mandatory for all Annex I parties. COP 8 undertook
to revise and streamline the review process, and established
expert review teams (ERTs) to ensure that each country was
complying with its reporting requirements. 85
The ERT process has improved the quality of country-level
GHG inventory reports. Annex I countries now receive detailed
feedback from ERTs on the measurement methods employed in
each IPCC category, including recommendations on best practices
and suggestions for more accurate estimation methods.86 For
example, the report on Iceland’s 2011 submission noted that
“some mandatory categories are reported as not estimated . . . in
particular, CO 2 emissions and removals from mineral soils under
cropland and grassland . . . .”87 This type of detailed review
provides technical guidance meant to gradually push all Annex I
countries toward more standardized GHG reporting procedures.
However, the limits of this process are quickly apparent. The
IPCC guidelines are generic, and often do not reflect the realities
of the country’s energy output. Some countries, such as Ukraine,
rely heavily on IPCC methods rather than preparing data based
on actual surveys of the country’s industrial emitters.88 Since
AAUs are calculated based on an initial report submitted by
Annex I countries on January 1, 2007 (or one year after the entry
into force of the Kyoto Protocol), minor variations in reporting
83. TASK
FORCE
ON
NAT’L
GREENHOUSE
GAS
INVENTORIES ,
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE , R EVISED 1996 IPCC
GUIDELINES FOR NATIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INVENTORIES 2.1–2.7 (1996),
available at http://www.ipcc-nggip.iges.or.jp/public/gl/invs4.html.
84. UNFCCC RCPSMPKP, supra note 72, at 26-27.
85. See UNFCCC RCPSMPKP Adv., supra note 69.
86. See UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON C LIMATE C HANGE ,
KYOTO PROTOCOL REFERENCE M ANUAL ON A CCOUNTING OF EMISSIONS AND
ASSIGNED AMOUNT 26-28 (2008).
87. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the
individual review of the annual submission of Iceland submitted in 2011, 9, U.N.
Doc. FCCC/ARR/2011/ISL (Dec. 19, 2011).
88. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the
individual review of the annual submission of Ukraine submitted in 2011, 53,
U.N. Doc. FCCC/ARR/2010/UKR (June 3, 2011).
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methods from year-to-year can result in substantial adjustments
to a country’s available AAUs.89
This is an important problem because the AAU trading
system is supposed to function as a relatively decentralized
market exchange. National registries created by all thirty-eight
signatories serve as accounts for the country’s AAUs. The
government, or an entity legally recognized by the government,
will register its credits through the national system. 90 If a seller
in the EU’s ETS, for example, seeks a trade with a buyer in New
Zealand, an international transaction log (ITL) kept by the
UNFCCC secretariat will verify the transaction by checking the
national registry with other national registries to ensure a
match.91 The procedures are laid out in data exchange standards
adopted by the UNFCCC’s Subsidiary Body for Scientific and
Technological Advice (SBSTA).92 The ITL system functions in
conjunction with the CDM registry, which accounts for all CERs
approved by the CDM’s Executive Board.93 The system is
designed to provide a seamless platform for trading Kyoto credits
between countries. Unfortunately, due to technical delays and a
lack of participation, the majority of tradable credits being
registered by the system are primarily CERs. 94 There has yet to
develop a market for tradable AAUs, in part because the primary
trading partners are members of the EU ETS, which keeps a
separate, but complementary registry for transactions taking
place within the European Community. 95 New Zealand’s
proposed ETS will utilize Kyoto credits, so there is the potential
that the ITL will serve as a clearinghouse house for trades
between New Zealand and the EU, but so far its functionality is
limited primarily to registering CERs and crediting national
registries with emissions reductions. 96
89. UNFCCC RCPSMPKP, supra note 72, at 23.
90. Id. at 28.
91. Id.
92. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice, Data Exchange
Standards for Registry Systems under the Kyoto Protocol (Dec. 16, 2010).
93. UNFCCC RCPSMPKP, supra note 72, at 31.
94. Cameron Hepburn, Carbon Trading: A Review of Kyoto Mechanisms, 32
ANN. REV . ENVTL. R ESOURCES 375, 380 (2007).
95. Id. at 380-81.
96. Perdan & Azapagic, supra note 14, at 6046.
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Since the CDM’s Executive Board is granted the authority to
review and approve new projects according to standards and
methods developed independently from the GHG inventory
system, CDM has developed its own set of MRVs. Unlike the
national inventory process, CDM’s primary concern is with
validating the emission reductions from a specific project. At the
project design phase, a project participant—typically a private
emitter and a developing country investor—submit a project
design document that gives a general overview of the project and
details the methodology being used to calculate an emissions
reduction.97 The project participant can either propose a new
methodology, in which case the CDM Executive Board will review
the proposal and verify its approval of the proposed method, or
use one of the pre-packaged methods laid out in a CDM
Methodology Booklet created by the secretariat and approved by
the Executive Board.98 The monitoring and verification process is
actually delegated to an accredited third-party designated
operational entity, such as Det Norske Veritas (DNV), one of the
largest providers of validation and certification services for CDM
projects.99 In a typical project, an emitter would contact DNV to
develop and implement a project design document that complies
with the CDM’s methodologies. DNV would then work with its
client to ensure that the project was designed to properly monitor
and verify any emissions reductions. DNV would then certify
that the project participant had followed the plan. 100 The CDM’s
secretariat and the Executive Board would then vet the project
and register the reductions as CERs unless at least three of the
CDM’s board members request a review.101

97. See CLEAN DEV . M ECHANISM EXEC. B D., GUIDELINES FOR COMPLETING THE
PROJECT DESIGN DOCUMENT (CDM-PDD) AND THE PROPOSED NEW B ASELINE AND
M ONITORING M ETHODOLOGIES (2008).
98. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, CDM
Methodology
Booklet
(May 2012), http://cdm.unfccc.int/methodologies/
documentation/methbooklet.pdf [hereinafter CDM Methodology Booklet].
99. Carbon Offset Validation & Verification, DET NORSKE V ERITAS ,
http://www.dnvusa.com/services/verification/carbon_credit_validation_verificatio
n/index.asp (last visited Aug. 22, 2012).
100. DET NORSKE V ERITAS , CLIMATE CHANGE S ERVICES (2012), available at
http://www.dnvusa.com/focus/climate_change.
101. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Nov. 28-Dec.
10, 2005, Report of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the
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The JI process is similar, but substantially less developed. A
JI project also delegates MRV to an accredited third party
certified by the JI Supervisory Committee. 102 To initiate a
project, the parties must provide a project design document
setting forth the proposed emission reduction and an “appropriate
baseline and monitoring plan” in accordance with the JI’s
criteria.103 The accredited third party is responsible for
monitoring and verifying that the emissions reductions were
actually achieved, which, according to the criteria, involve “the
collection and archiving of all relevant data necessary for
estimating or measuring anthropogenic emissions by sources
and/or anthropogenic removals by sinks of greenhouse gases
occurring within the project boundary during the crediting
period.”104 Since the CDM has processed far more projects, it has
developed a more thorough set of methodologies for calculating
emissions reductions. To the degree feasible, the JI Supervisory
Committee applies the CDM’s methodologies to evaluate a JI
project design document.105 This means that for both Kyoto
mechanisms, third-party entities are the key component in
ensuring that proper MRV procedures are followed.
C. Problems with the Kyoto Process
In many respects, the Kyoto process is an ideal framework
for facilitating international carbon trading. It has welldeveloped technical specifications for preparing annual GHG
inventories from Annex I countries, the CDM and JI, although
limited in scope, have successfully approved projects that on
paper limit GHG emissions, and the institutional framework
includes a rigorous review and enforcement procedure. For
example, in November 2001, the conference of the parties adopted
Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on its first session, ¶ 35, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.1 (Mar. 30, 2006).
102. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Nov. 28-Dec.
10, 2005, Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the
Kyoto Protocol, Guidelines for the implementation of Article 6 of the Kyoto
Protocol, U.N. Doc. FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.2 (Mar. 30, 2006) [hereinafter
UNFCCC Guidelines for the implementation of Article 6].
103. Id. at 8.
104. Id. at 12.
105. See JOINT IMPLEMENTATION S UPERVISORY COMM ., GUIDANCE ON C RITERIA
FOR B ASELINE S ETTING AND M ONITORING (Sept. 14, 2011).
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the Marrakesh Accords, which established a Compliance
Committee that includes two branches. 106 The Facilitative
Branch provides (1) advice and assistance, (2) facilitates financial
and technical assistance, and (3) formulates recommendations to
achieve compliance.107 The Enforcement Branch can declare a
party in noncompliance with the Protocol’s monitoring and
reporting requirements, its eligibility tests for participation in the
flexibility mechanism, or its emissions targets. 108 A question of
implementation can be brought before either branch by a party or
through an ERT. If a noncompliance declaration is made, the
Enforcement Branch can impose sanctions, including suspension
from participation in the flexibility mechanisms, requiring the
preparation of an action plan to achieve compliance, and a
deduction of its emissions allowance during a subsequent
commitment period.109 When put in perspective, Kyoto’s
compliance procedures are, on paper, equal to or better than
other multilateral environmental agreements.
Unfortunately, the Kyoto Protocol suffers from a far more
fatal flaw. Although technical discussions have proceeded along
an upward trajectory, the parties lack the political will to impose
tougher commitments without greater participation from nonAnnex I countries, especially the BRICs. Certain Annex I
members, plus the United States, insist that a new commitment
period include participation from non-Annex I countries.
Proposals include requiring non-Annex I countries to submit
national adaptation or mitigation plans that would be reviewed in
a manner similar to the annual GHG inventory reports. 110 Since
the Kyoto Protocol’s first five-year commitment period is
scheduled to end in 2012, parties have been attempting since
Copenhagen to reach an agreement on a second commitment
period. Durban presented the final, scheduled opportunity to
reach a conclusion, after which the treaty’s legal form would
lapse.111 Although negotiators reached a last-minute settlement
106. See UNFCCC Guidelines for the implementation of Article 6, supra note
102, at 93.
107. Id. at 94-95, 101.
108. Id. at 95-96.
109. Id. at 96, 102.
110. Interview with Climate Change Negotiators (Fall 2011).
111. See Torney & Fujiwara, supra note 63.
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that extended the treaty’s legal form to a second commitment
period lasting until either 2017 or 2020, the Durban COP also
established a second working group charged with developing an
alternative to the Kyoto commitments after 2020, presumably one
that would include non-Annex I commitments.112 For long-time
observers of the Kyoto negotiations, these agreements appear to
be stalling for time. Without a commitment from the United
States to join the Kyoto Protocol, the political future of the Kyoto
process appears uncertain.
It is the political uncertainty of the international regulatory
environment that makes it an ineffective approach to creating
linkages between carbon trading markets that are developing
nationally or regionally. Investing in international carbon
trading requires a commitment of substantial financial resources.
Financial and consulting firms, brokers, and other market
traders need transparency and stability. There is very little
incentive to invest if market participants are constantly worried
that the Kyoto Protocol’s emission trading system is about to
collapse. In addition, any decision to include non-Annex I
countries could significantly impact the allocation of existing
AAUs, which increases the risk that a carbon transaction would
fail. Carbon transactions across international markets, which are
primarily in the form of ERUs and CERs, are considered highrisk investments because of the uncertainty surrounding the
recognition of those credits in established carbon trading
markets. That uncertainty is unlikely to decline now that parties
to the Kyoto Protocol have endorsed new negotiations under the
auspices of the Durban Enhanced Action Plan.
In
the
long-run,
some
form
of
international,
intergovernmental regulation of carbon trading will be required.
Unfortunately, there is no guarantee when that regulation will be
widely adopted or that it will look like the Kyoto mechanisms.
There is simply too much uncertainty in the political process to
guarantee the level of coordination necessary to make a complex,
interdependent emissions trading system like the Kyoto
mechanism successful. What is more likely is that the CDM and
112. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Nov. 28-Dec.
11, 2011, Durban, S. Afr., Conference of the Parties, Establishment of an Ad Hoc
Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, 2, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1 (Mar. 15, 2012).
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the JI, which are both supported by a broad coalition of Annex I
and non-Annex I parties, will continue to operate, producing
tradable emissions credits that are transferrable with emissions
credits distributed by national authorities. The trading in offsets
will likely be the only international trading that will occur
through the Kyoto mechanism. Instead, it is far more probable
that international trading will take place through bilateral or
multilateral agreements between different trading schemes. The
next section will discuss how to facilitate greater trading through
the harmonization and mutual recognition of MRV procedures
among national trading schemes.
V.

COMPARISON OF NATIONAL MRV
PROCEDURES

A. European Union Emissions Trading Scheme
The EU’s ETS was the first carbon trading market to be
implemented by a regional authority. Although it was developed
in response to the Kyoto Protocol, the EU’s ETS actually preceded
the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol by more than a month.
Launched in January 2005, the Kyoto Protocol would finally be
ratified on February 16, 2005. As a consequence, the ETS was
not originally intended to incorporate the various flexible
mechanisms of the Protocol (CDM, JI, and AAU trading). 113
Within the EU, the United Kingdom and Denmark were
considered the leaders in market-based emissions trading.
Denmark had established a pilot program for electricity
generators that ran from 2001 to 2003, but the UK Emissions
Trading Scheme was the first multi-industry market, and became
a model program for the Europe-wide initiative.114
The system employs a complex set of overlapping regulatory
bodies at the regional and national level. Each EU member state
government is given a national emission cap that matches its
Member State National Allocation Plan (NAP). 115 The NAP is
based on the country’s UNFCCC Annex I-defined binding
113. See Frank J. Convery, Origins and Development of the EU ETS, 43
ENVTL. & RES. ECON. 391, 395-96 (2009).
114. Id. at 391.
115. Council Directive 2003/87, art. 9, 2003 O.J. (L 275) 32, 35-36 (EC).
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commitments negotiated as part of the Kyoto Protocol. The EU
Commission approves each NAP and national emission cap to
ensure that they meet the requirements of the EU’s Emission
Trading Directive.116 The NAP is based on the percentage of CO 2
emissions in the EU that is estimated to be released by emitters
covered under the ETS. Since this includes less than half of the
total emissions produced in the Euro-area, member state
governments are also obligated to make reductions in emissions
from non-covered sectors such as transportation. 117 In practice,
little effort has been made on directly regulating these sources,
with the exception of aviation, which was brought into the EU
ETS scheme in 2008.118
Since the ETS was based on smaller, less complicated
national models, the Commission decided to implement the
program in stages. Phase I (2005-2007) included a small number
of industrial sectors that accounted for a significant portion of
industrial CO 2 emissions.119 Roughly 11,500 installations related
to primary-source energy production, certain industrial
producers, and the pulp and paper industry were originally
included.120 Permits were distributed based on the policies of
each member state government, and during Phase I most of the
initial permits were provided free of charge, rather than
auctioned as is typical for mature pollution trading systems. 121
Phase II, implemented in 2008 and scheduled to last until 2012,
made several important changes. First, the Commission passed
its “Linking Directive,” which established a linkage with the
Kyoto Protocol’s flexible mechanisms.122 Emitters were allowed
to exchange a certain number of Kyoto Protocol units from CDM
or JI projects for EU ETS credits. 123 Second, the Commission
agreed to incorporate emissions from aviation activities in the
Euro-area by 2012.124 Finally, a significant effort was made to
116. Id. at art. 9a.
117. Id.
118. Id. at ch. II.
119. See Betz & Sato, supra note 56, at 355.
120. See Convery, supra note 113, at 407.
121. See Council Directive 2003/87, art. 11, 2003 O.J. (L 275) 32, 36 (EC).
122. Council Directive 2004/101, 2004 O.J. (L 338) 18 (EC) (amending Council
Directive 2003/87/EC).
123. Id.
124. See Council Directive 2003/87, art. 11a, 2003 O.J. (L 275) 32 (EC).
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increase member state compliance with Council Directives, in
particular, to improve the detail of member-state submitted
NAPs.
i. Monitoring
The EU Commission established the most recent regulations
for monitoring and reporting GHG emissions on June 21, 2012,
replacing a 2007 Decision with a more comprehensive set of
technical guidelines.125 The Regulation requires that all GHG
monitoring and reporting “be complete and cover all process and
combustion emissions from all emission sources and source
streams belonging to activities” specified in the technical
appendix and covered under Council Directive 2003/87/EC. 126
For stationary sources, this includes accounting for any
“abnormal events including start-up and shutdown and
emergency situations over the reporting period . . . .”127
The operator of an installation is given the choice to use a
calculation-based methodology or a measurement-based
methodology.128 If the operator adopts a calculation-based
method, it must select the methodology required under Annex IV
for its particular industry or “provide[] evidence to the competent
authorities that the use of such methodology is technically not
feasible or incurs unreasonable costs, or that another
methodology leads to a higher overall accuracy of emissions
data.”129 The Regulations allow the operator to combine different
monitoring methods at a single installation provided that no
double accounting occurs.130 At the start of each reporting period,
the operator is required to submit to its national regulatory
authority a detailed monitoring plan setting forth the type of
emissions being measured, the methodology used, and a variety of
other details about the emission stream. 131 Any changes to the

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Commission Regulation 601/2012, art. 30, 2012 O.J. (L 181) 30 (EC).
Id. at art. 5.
Id. at art. 20.
Id. at art. 21.
Id.
Id.
Commission Regulation 601/2012, art. 11, 2012 O.J. (L 181) 30 (EC).
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operation of the facility that would affect the monitoring plan’s
accuracy must be reported to the national regulatory authority.132
The calculation-based approach applies a simple formula:
CO2 emissions = activity data X emission factor X oxidation
factor.133 For combustion emissions, activity data is the fuel flow
expressed in terms of energy content.134 For process emissions,
activity data is the material consumption, throughput or
production output, which is also expressed in terms of energy
content.135 A conversion factor is applied to address any input
materials that were not converted to CO 2 during the production
process.136 The EU ETS attempts to minimize the reporting
requirements for smaller emitters by creating a tier-based
approach to calculating an installation’s emissions. Smaller
installations are permitted to use less accurate calculations, and
any installation may seek an exemption from the minimum
requirement if they can show that such calculations are
technically infeasible or likely to lead to unreasonably high
costs.137 The Regulation clearly favors direct measurement of
activity data. However, if an operator can prove that direct
measurement is technically infeasible or would lead to
unreasonably high costs, it can either estimate using data from
previous years or supply audited financial documents containing
documented methods that produced data on material use during
the reporting period.138 The measurement-based approach,
which employs a CEM system, requires operators to use CEN
standards issued by the European Committee for
Standardization.139 If CEN standards are unavailable, the
operator should look to ISO standards or relevant national
standards.140
Operators are required to provide hourly
averages.141

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id. at art. 14.
Id. at art. 24.
Id.
Id. at art. 25.
Id.
Commission Regulation 601/2012, art. 26, 2012 O.J. (L 181) 30 (EC).
Id. at art. 27.
Id. at art. 42.
Id.
Id. at art. 43.
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ii. Reporting
The Commission requires installation operators to file annual
reports that include the calculations and other assumptions used
during the monitoring process.142 These reports are submitted to
the operator’s national regulatory authority before submission to
the Commission.143
For the most part, the reporting
requirements simply ask the operator to show its work by
including all sources, calculations, measurement methodologies,
uncertainties, and other assumptions used to arrive at the total
emissions calculation.144 Emissions from different source
streams at a single installation that belong to the same type of
activity can be aggregated by the operator.145 For example, a
refinery with multiple smokestacks emitting CO 2 can aggregate
its emissions from each source in the final report. Each report
must be labeled using both the Common Reporting Format of the
UNFCCC’s GHG inventory system and the Integrated Pollution
Prevention and Control code contained in Annex I of Regulation
166/2006.146 The IPPC codes were developed as part of Directive
2008/1/EC, which established an integrated method for
monitoring and reporting industrial pollutants in the European
Community.147 The practical effect of these requirements is to
make reporting relatively standardized. ETS emissions can be
compared directly with emissions from other Kyoto -compliant
carbon-trading markets, potentially improving the transparency
of the trade. In addition, ETS reporting is not duplicative of
IPPC reporting, potentially reducing the regulatory burden.
The Commission also requires rigorous record-keeping.
Operators are required to keep records sufficient to allow for the
verification of its annual emissions report, but also to maintain
an archive of data, including detailed information on the
calculations used in its measurement methodology, for up to ten
years.148
To ensure that operators are complying, the

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id. at art. 67.
Commission Regulation 601/2012, art. 67, 2012 O.J. (L 181) 30 (EC).
Id. at art. 7.
Id. at art. 19.
Id. at art. 73.
See Council Directive 2008/1, 2008 O.J. (L 24) 8, 19 (EC).
Commission Regulation 601/2012, art. 66, 2012 O.J. (L 181) 30 (EC).
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Commission also requires the establishment of a control system
that ensures that “the annual emissions report . . . resulting from
the data flow activities does not contain misstatements and is in
conformity with the monitoring plan and [the Commission’s]
Regulation.”149 An approved control system must include “an
operator’s or aircraft operator’s assessment of inherent risks and
control risks” and “written procedures related to control activities
that are to mitigate the risks identified.”150 Those written
procedures must at least include the following elements:
(a) quality assurance of the measurement equipment; (b) quality
assurance of the information technology system used for data
flow activities, including process control computer technology; (c)
segregation of duties in the data flow activities and control
activities as well as management of necessary competencies; (d)
internal reviews and validation of data; (e) corrections and
corrective action; (f) control of out-sourced processes; (g) keeping
records and documentation including the management of
document versions. 151

The operator is required to periodically evaluate and improve
its control system through internal audits. 152 At the operator’s
discretion, the control system may reference procedures or
documents contained in other management systems, including
the EU Eco-Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS), ISO
14001:2004 (environmental management systems), ISO
9001:2000 (general management systems), and financial control
systems.153
For quality assurance procedures applied to
continuous emission measurement systems, operators are
required to follow EN 14181, Quality Assurance of Automated
Measuring Systems.154

149. Id. at art. 58.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. These systems were directly referenced in the Commissions 2007
Decision, but in the 2012 Regulations the language reads “measurement
standards traceable to international measurement standards . . . .” Id. at art. 59.
It is unclear whether this allows the operator to select from a wider set of
international standards.
154. Id.
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iii. Verification
Since the EU is a multi-level governance structure that
incorporates a variety of different national regulatory schemes,
verification is particularly difficult. The first step in the
verification process is at the national level. The national
regulatory authority is the institution that reviews the emissions
reports of operators within their national jurisdiction. 155 Since
each regulatory authority has its own unique capabilities and
existing domestic regulations, the Commission’s initial approach
was to set forth a general set of principles to guide verifiers
through the process.156 With the promulgation of Phase III
regulations, the Commission adopted a separate set of regulations
for verification that dramatically increase the requirements for
verification, accreditation of third-party verifiers, and standards
for accrediting bodies in the member states.157
The initial step is to assess each annual emissions report
using a strategic and risk analysis. The strategic analysis
involves (1) determining whether the annual emissions report has
been properly approved by the competent national regulatory
authority, (2) whether the verifier can understand each activity
undertaken at the installation, and (3) understand the
monitoring plan and control system.158 Once a strategic analysis
is complete, the verifier must (1) assess the risk of misstatement
or omission given the complexity and scope of the operator ’s
emissions, and (2) develop a verification plan, including a
description of the activities at the installation and the data
sampling necessary to verify those activities. 159
Once a verification plan is in place, the verifier must
determine what actions must be taken to carry out that plan.
This may include a site visit to visually inspect measurement
technology or control systems, conduct interviews, or collect other
necessary evidence.160 If a site visit is not required, the verifier
155. Council Directive 2003/87, art. 15, 2003 O.J. (L 275) 32 (EC) (“Member
States shall ensure that the reports submitted by operators pursuant to Article
14(3) are verified in accordance with the criteria set out in Annex V . . . .”).
156. Commission Decision 2007/589, 2007 O.J. (L 229) 1, 30-33 (EC).
157. See Commission Regulation 600/2012, 2012 O.J. (L 181) 1 (EC).
158. Id. at art. 11.
159. Id. at arts. 12-13.
160. Id. at arts. 14, 16, 21.
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must still carry out the verification plan by collecting enough
data using the defined sampling methods to determine whether
the operator’s annual emissions report is accurate. 161 If the
report is missing data, or the verifier identifies noncompliance
with the installation’s monitoring plan, the verifier must ensure
that the operator is informed of its misstatements or omissions,
and correct them before verification is complete. 162 The verifier
must then produce an internal verification report demonstrating
that the verification plan has been implemented. 163 The 2012
Regulations have added an additional layer of oversight,
requiring that a third-party verifier submit its internal
verification report to an independent reviewer.164
The
independent reviewer, which was not involved in the verification
process, must then determine whether the third-party verifier
complied with the Commission’s Regulations when it conducted
its verification activities.165 After completing the verification
plan, the verifier produces a final report, an opinion regarding
compliance, and documentation showing its methodology to the
operator.166 An operator is then required to submit the
verification report, along with his annual emissions report, to the
competent national regulatory authority. 167
It is important to note that a third-party verifier may be
either a competent national authority or a non-governmental
private party. The EU’s regulations require that all verifiers:
1) Maintain a competence process, which requires
documentation that the verifiers are trained, properly
supervised, and subject to periodic internal reviews. 168
2) Assemble a verification team with clearly delineated
responsibilities and the competence necessary to assess
the scientific and technical details of the installation’s
processes and procedures.169

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id. at arts. 18-20.
Id. at art. 22.
Commission Regulation 600/2012, art. 16, 2012 O.J. (L 181) 1 (EC).
Id. at art. 25.
Id.
Id. at art. 27.
Id. at art. 74.
Id. at art. 35.
Commission Regulation 600/2012, art. 36, 2012 O.J. (L 181) 1 (EC).
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3) Keep clear documentation of verification procedures and
records of verification activities. 170
4) Ensure that the verifier is impartial and independent of
the operator, is organized in such a way as to maintain its
impartiality and independence, and meets the conflict of
interest requirements found in Article 42, paragraphs 4
and 5.171
Verifiers must also be accredited by a national accreditation
body established by the operator’s national authority pursuant to
Article 5(1) of Commission Regulation 765/2008. 172 If a private
third-party verifier seeks accreditation, it must provide all
information requested by the national accreditation body, in
particular the verifier’s competence process, how it plans to
maintain continuous impartiality and independence, its technical
expertise, and the verifier’s record-keeping procedures.173
Private third-party auditors play an important role in the EU
ETS system. They function as the first line of defense against
mistakes or omissions in the monitoring plans and annual
emission reports of EU operators. For example, VerifAvia is an
accredited verification service for the EU’s aviation sector.174 The
company offers aviation-sector clients a general service aimed at
auditing and improving the control systems described above, as
well as a verification service intended to ensure compliance with
EU regulations.175 The scope of a private auditor’s services
depends on the needs of a client. Some national governments will
have substantial environmental regulations already in place that
require operators to implement certain monitoring technologies.
Other governments may have very little regulation, requiring a
third-party verifier to work closely with an operator to ensure the
implementation of proper monitoring and reporting techniques.

170. Id. at arts. 40-41.
171. Id. at art. 42.
172. Id. at art. 45.
173. Id.
174. See V ERIFAVIA, http://www.verifavia.com/en/index.php (last visited Sept.
30, 2012).
175. Id.
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B. New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme
On September 25, 2008, New Zealand’s parliament passed
The Climate Change Response Amendment Act 2008
(Amendment Act), establishing a wide-ranging emissions trading
scheme second only in scope to the EU’s ETS.176 The Amendment
Act will regulate the emissions of all six main GHGs listed in
Annex A of the Kyoto Protocol. 177 The scope of the eventual
regulations may be even broader than the ETS, encompassing
forestry, transportation, primary energy generators, industrial
facilities, agriculture, and waste.178 Agriculture and forestry are
particularly difficult sectors to regulate effectively. In the case of
large agricultural producers, the primary GHGs are CH 4 and N20.
CH 4 is released as a byproduct of animal waste, and at a technical
level, estimating CH 4 emissions based on the size of animal herds
is actually far easier than achieving accurate measurements of
smokestack emissions.179 N20 emissions occur largely through
the use of fertilizers, and measuring this type of emission will
likely depend on self-reporting and the occasional audit. What is
surprising about New Zealand’s program is that agricultural
producers are an especially influential political constituent,
making regulations politically costly to impose. 180
Like the EU, New Zealand’s trading scheme also imposes its
emission reduction targets at producers or importers who are
sufficiently high in the supply chain. After its first year of
operation, New Zealand’s ETS has ninety-six mandatory
participants, primarily in the coal and natural gas sectors. 181 By
placing the point of obligation upstream, MRV procedures are
176. Climate Change Response (Emissions Trading) Amendment Act 2008
(N.Z.).
177. This includes CO2, CH4, N20, hyroflurocarbons (HFCs), PFCs, and
sulphur hexafluoride.
178. See Climate Change Response (Emissions Trading) Amendment Act 2008,
Third Schedule (N.Z.).
179. See Philip Robertson et al., Greenhouse Gases in Intensive Agriculture:
Contributions of Individual Gases to the Radiative Forcing of the Atmosphere,
289 S CI. 1922 (2000).
180. Within the EU, this is even more difficult given the prominent role played
by the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy. See David Bullock, Emissions Trading
in New Zealand: Development, Challenges, and Design, 21 ENVTL. POL. 657
(2012).
181. N.Z. EMISSIONS TRADING S CHEME , supra note 46, at 7.
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more cost-effective. However, it risks insulating consumers from
the price changes associated with emissions reductions. 182 It also
risks making the emissions trading market substantially less
liquid. There will be fewer trades, and fewer tradable credits,
than if the market involved smaller emitters, making it more
susceptible to market manipulation. However, this is partially
offset by New Zealand’s decision to comprehensively cover all
major industrial sectors.
Another special variation of the New Zealand scheme is that
its cap is set in reference to New Zealand’s AAUs allocated
through the Kyoto Protocol’s legally binding commitments.183
This allows the government to issue New Zealand Units (NZUs)
that are directly based on the total allowable CO 2 equivalent tons
of greenhouse emissions provided under the country’s Annex I
commitment, and allows the emitter to import energy units from
Kyoto-approved mechanisms, such as the CDM or JI projects.
Unlike the EU ETS, which has received substantial criticism
from developing countries for walling off CDM or JI projects from
access to its market, New Zealand’s ETS will provide complete
compatibility with Kyoto-based market mechanisms.184 A JI
project formed with an Indonesian industrial producer that
receives certification for a particular amount of EMUs could be
imported to New Zealand to provide an equal number of NZUs.
Unfortunately, since New Zealand is the only major ETS to create
complete compatibility, it does not necessarily mean that the ETS
will be easier to link with other carbon markets. An emitter
seeking to export EMUs from within the Eurozone will still have
to conform to the EU’s ETS regulations.
The obvious downside for New Zealand emitters is that once
the program is fully up and running (estimated to be sometime
before the end of 2013), they will have to deal with a cap on total
emissions that is equal to the legally binding commitments
contained in Annex I of the Kyoto Protocol. The EU ETS was
established to insulate European producers from the full
182. Robbie Andrew & V icky Forgie, A three-perspective view of greenhouse gas
emission responsibilities in New Zealand, 68 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 194 (2008).
183. Climate Change Response Act 2002, pt. 4, cl 68, 69(2) (N.Z.) [hereinafter
C.C. Response Act].
184. Nan Jiang et al., New Zealand’s Emissions Trading Scheme, 43 N.Z.
ECON. PAPERS 69 (2009).
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consequences of the Kyoto commitments until the Protocol
became fully implemented by every Annex I member state. 185
The EU had no intention of creating a trading scheme that would
let its domestic producers suffer relative to its strategic economic
competitors. There has been some suggestion that the New
Zealand government, through the purchase of CERs or AAUs,
might lower the initial risk to New Zealand producers. The
government would purchase CERs or AAUs using the Kyoto
trading system, which would reduce the overall cap on industry
that would be required to meet New Zealand’s Kyoto
commitments.186 However, to successfully use this strategy New
Zealand will have to establish standards and procedures for
linking its market to other ETS systems, especially given the
differing standards for assessing inter-market trading in the EU
ETS.
i. Monitoring and Reporting
Since the New Zealand ETS is being implemented on a
sector-by-sector basis, this Comment focuses on the sectors that,
under current law, are obligated to report emissions. This
includes forestry, stationary energy sources, industrial processes,
and liquid fossil fuels.187 Unlike the EU ETS, which has a
standard monitoring and reporting framework for each sector, the
New Zealand ETS provides separate regulations applicable to
each. To the degree possible, sector requirements will be
presented side-by-side. For stationary energy sources and
industrial processes, the ETS primarily requires calculationbased methodology similar to the EU ETS model. 188 For
example, a coal-fired power plant is required to account for
imported coal using a formula that incorporates the total amount
of coal (imports minus exports), the energy content, any
adjustment from stockpiling, and any unique emissions factors. 189
Different formulas are required for mined coal or for any coal
185. Convery, supra note 113, at 399.
186. Bullock, supra note 180, at 671.
187. See Climate Change Response Act 2002, Third Schedule, cl 1-6 (N.Z.).
188. See, e.g., Climate Change (Stationary Energy and Industrial Processes)
Regulations 2009, SR 2009/285, reg 35 (N.Z.) (calculation method for producers
of aluminum) [hereinafter Energy and Indus. Regs.].
189. Id. at reg 8.
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converted to gas using a UCG operation.190 Similar formulas are
required for natural gas, geothermal fluid, municipal waste or
waste oil, and petroleum refining. For certain measurements,
participants are required to employ continuous monitoring
technologies.191 To measure mined natural gas emissions, the
operator is required, where possible, to sample every thirty
minutes, or else at least at intervals of not longer than three
months. The samples must then be tested by a government
laboratory or an accredited laboratory complying with ISO
17025:2005.192 CEM may also be used by an operator combusting
oil, waste oil, used tires, or municipal waste. 193
Measurement of industrial processes occurs solely through
calculation-based methods. Each industrial sector is divided into
a category based on either the material used or the type of gas
emitted, such as perfluorocarbons or aluminum smelting. The
emitter is responsible for collecting activity-based information
and properly applying the factors listed. 194 For liquid fossil fuel
users, the ETS requires an accounting of the type and volume of
fuel removed for either home, industrial, or transportation
consumption.195 The regulations exempt users who employ an
amount of fuel below a threshold set by Regulation 5, which
means only heavy users of liquid fuels will be required to monitor
and report.196 To calculate total emissions, the user must provide
the amount of fuel used and any unique emissions factors. 197 One
feature of New Zealand’s regulations is the attempt to address
potential leakages by including so-called “opt-in participants.”
These are entities otherwise not regulated who purchase more
than a specified amount of either coal or natural gas. 198 This
feature prevents circumventing reporting requirements by
purchasing arrangements through third-parties.
190. Id. at reg 11(1).
191. E.g., id. at reg 16(3).
192. Id.
193. Id. at reg 24.
194. E.g., Energy and Indus. Regs., supra note 188, at reg 34 (aluminum
producers).
195. Climate Change (Liquid Fossil Fuels) Regulations 2008, SR 2008/356, reg
5 (N.Z.) [hereinafter Fossil Fuels Regs.].
196. Id.
197. Energy and Indus. Regs., supra note 188, at reg 44(G).
198. Id. at regs 45, 48.
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Each participant is required to submit an annual emission
return that contains (1) a record of the participant’s activities, (2)
the measurement methodology employed and any corresponding
calculations, (3) an assessment of the participant’s liability to
surrender NZUs based on the annual emissions, and (4) any
additional requirements contained in the Ministry of Economic
Development’s (MED) regulations.199 Participants are required
to maintain records that allow the MED to verify emissions
reductions. These include sales receipts or invoices, customs
documentation, supplier contracts or agreements, or any other
document produced during the monitoring process, such as lab
reports or internal audits.200 Like the EU ETS, participants are
required to maintain some type of internal quality control
process.201 One distinctive aspect of the New Zealand system is
that participants can seek to apply a unique emissions factor by
applying to the MED. The participant must prove that the
unique emissions factor differs substantially from the generic
factor for that type of fuel.202 It must then undergo an “activityspecific prescribed sampling and testing regime” and be verified
by a recognized verifier.203 This is a key component of New
Zealand’s ETS because third-party verification of emissions
reports is only required if the participant has applied for and
received permission to use a unique emissions factor.
Under the New Zealand Emission Trading Scheme (ETS),
each participant receives a limited number of NZU, which are
distributed in proportion to each industry’s contribution to New
Zealand’s Annex I Kyoto Protocol target.204 One NZU is equal to
one ton of CO 2 equivalent greenhouse gas, and is designed to be
directly transferrable with the Kyoto Protocol’s trading units. A
unique aspect of New Zealand’s ETS is the participation of the
forestry sector. The owner of any forested area larger than one
199. C.C. Response Act, supra note 183, at pt. 4, cl 65.
200. NEW ZEALAND M INISTRY FOR THE ENV ’T, REPORTING GUIDANCE FOR THE
S TATIONARY ENERGY AND INDUSTRIAL PROCESSES AND LIQUID FOSSIL FUELS
S ECTORS UNDER THE NEW ZEALAND EMISSIONS TRADING S CHEME 4 (2009)
[hereinafter N.Z. R EPORTING GUIDANCE ].
201. Id. at 7.
202. Climate Change (Unique Emissions Factors) Regulations 2009, SR
2009/286, reg 4(2)(b)(i) (N.Z.) [hereinafter Unique Emissions Regs.].
203. Id. at reg 4.
204. C.C. Response Act, supra note 183, at pt. 4, cl 68.
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hectare can participate as long as each hectare has more than
30% tree crown cover.205 Forestry participants are divided
between owners of land forested prior to December 31, 1989 and
owners of land with forested areas established after that date. 206
Since the legislation is primarily intended to prevent
deforestation, participation by pre-1990 land owners is
mandatory if the landowner deforests more than two acres during
the ETS’s five-year commitment period.207 Post-1990 land
owners can volunteer to participate in order to receive credit for
reforestation projects.208
For pre-1990 owners, the ETS allocates a specific number of
NZUs based on the total forested area as of January 1, 2008. 209
For land that has not changed ownership arrangements since
October 31, 2002, the owner will be allocated sixty NZUs. 210
Owners that received the forested area by transfer after that date
will be allocated thirty-nine NZUs.211 The owner of any land held
under New Zealand’s Crown forest license that was or will be
transferred to a New Zealand indigenous group under a treaty of
settlement will receive eighteen NZUs.212 The ETS exempts pre1990 owners from submitting annual monitoring reports, but does
impose a reporting requirement for any deforestation. 213 The
pre-1990s owner must establish evidence of ownership, provide a
geospatial map of the area, and be capable of providing aerial
photos, planting records, or tree ages if there is any doubt from
the records that the area was forested before 1990. 214
Post-1990 owners of forested lands are not required to
participate in the ETS, but can receive NZUs for any measurable
increase in forested area on their property since 1990. 215 To
205. Id. at pt. 5, cl 179(1)(b).
206. Id. at pt. 5, cl 180(1).
207. Climate Change Response Act 2002, Third Schedule, pt. 1 (N.Z.).
208. C.C. Response Act, supra note 183, at pt. 5, cl 187.
209. Id. at, pt. 4, cl 72(2)(b) (N.Z.).
210. NEW ZEALAND M INISTRY OF AGRIC. & FORESTRY, A GUIDE TO THE PRE -1990
FORESTRY ALLOCATION AND EXEMPTIONS 5 (2010).
211. Id.
212. Id. at 6.
213. Climate Change (Forestry Sector) Regulations 2008, SR 2008/355, reg 17
(N.Z.).
214. NEW ZEALAND M INISTRY OF AGRIC. & FORESTRY, supra note 210, at 10.
215. C.C. Response Act, supra note 183, at pt. 5, cl 188.
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qualify, applicants are required to create an electronic map and
assign certain areas of the map as carbon accounting areas
(CAAs).216 The participant then submits periodic emissions
returns to the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MAF) to
show increases of the forested areas contained in their CAA. 217
Voluntary returns can be submitted as often as the participant
desires, but a mandatory return is required at the end of the five year commitment period.218
The MAF provides detailed
instructions on calculating the increase in a forested area based
on the geospatial mapping submitted by the participant. 219 Once
MAF determines the appropriate growth in the CAA’s carbon
stock, the ministry releases the NZUs to the participants’ trading
account.
ii. Verification
Since the New Zealand ETS is not a supranational authority,
its ETS regulations apply more typical command and control
verification procedures. Section 94 grants an authorized agent of
the Environmental Protection Authority (N.Z. EPA) the ability to
request “information that is reasonably necessary” to ascertain
whether a person is in compliance all relevant regulations. 220
This power is supplemented with the authority to require an inperson appearance before an appointed agent and the production
of documents in the person’s possession.221 An appointed agent
may also enter any land or premises at any reasonable time
during normal business hours to conduct an investigation into
whether the person is in compliance with the monitoring and
reporting requirements of the ETS.222 When necessary, the N.Z.
EPA can request a judicial inquiry before a district court judge. 223
Sections 129 through 143 establish penalties for non-compliance,
216. Climate Change (Forestry Sector) Regulations 2008, SR 2008/355, reg 18
(N.Z.).
217. Id. at reg 20.
218. C.C. Response Act, supra note 183, at pt. 5, cl 189(9).
219. Climate Change (Forestry Sector) Regulations 2008, SR 2008/355, Fifth
Schedule (N.Z.).
220. C.C. Response Act, supra note 183, at pt. 4, cl 94(1).
221. Id. at pt. 4, cl 95(1).
222. Id. at pt. 4, cl 100(1).
223. Id. at pt. 4, cl 96(1).
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evasion, failing to surrender NZU units upon the request of the
N.Z. EPA, and failure to submit the required documentation. 224
As mentioned above, only those participants seeking to apply
a unique emissions factor are required to achieve third-party
verification before submitting an annual emissions report.225 The
N.Z. EPA is authorized by statute to “recognize a person or
organisation with the prescribed expertise, technical competence,
or qualifications . . .” necessary to undertake verification
procedures for the approval of a unique emissions factor.226
Compared to the EU ETS, this provides a very limited statutory
role for a third-party auditor. However, the statute permits any
participant to submit verification of an annual emission report by
a third-party verifier, and the MED guidebook encourages
participants to do so.227 Once again, private, third-party auditors
are stepping into the regulatory space to provide certainty for
New Zealand’s ETS participants. Deloitte’s New Zealand office is
a recognized third-party verifier and offers to “[v]erify that your
emissions return and reporting methodologies comply with the
regulations” for clients seeking to minimize the risk of
noncompliance.228
Unlike the EU ETS, the primary
responsibility for verification still rests with the N.Z. EPA.
C. Opportunities for Policy Harmonization
Of the three regulatory approaches, the EU and New Zealand
have the most closely aligned MRV procedures for the types of
industries typically regulated under an emissions trading system.
Both rely primarily on calculation-based monitoring procedures,
employing a factor analysis that is similar in almost all
meaningful respects. Although New Zealand’s verification
procedures rely less on third-party verifiers, the statute provides
the N.Z. EPA with substantial authority to audit, investigate, and
penalize any noncompliance. Since the system is designed to
224. Id. at pt. 4, cl 129-43.
225. Unique Emissions Regs., supra note 202, at reg 4(2)(d).
226. C.C. Response Act, supra note 183, at pt. 4, cl 92(1); see also id. at cl
163(1)(e)(ii).
227. N.Z. REPORTING GUIDANCE , supra note 200, at 7.
228. Managing ETS Compliance, DELOITTE , http://www.deloitte.com/view/en_
NZ/nz/services/climate-change-andsustainability/managing etscompliance/index.
htm (last visited Apr. 12, 2012).
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target consumption at the highest level of the energy supply
chain, regulators are only presently enforcing compliance on
ninety-six active participants.229 The vast majority of those
participants are sophisticated business enterprises who can
reasonably be expected to know how to navigate New Zealand ’s
regulatory requirements. What might present more of a
challenge is whether New Zealand’s government will be willing to
accept the third-party verification procedures of the EU ETS.
The sheer size of the regulated market means that the EU
Commission and the relevant national regulatory authorities will
be required to address a more diverse and potentially less
sophisticated set of participants. The Commission itself is limited
to reviewing verification determinations from Member States
through an awkward consultation process prescribed by Council
Directive 2003.230 If more reports surface of an EU process that
lacks the requisite oversight of third-party verifiers, New Zealand
regulators may be hesitant to recognize certain EU ETS
emissions credits.
Although both markets will eventually make their domestic
credits directly transferrable to Kyoto units, the New Zealand
ETS’s NZUs are transferrable on a one-to-one basis with other
Kyoto units.231 This allows New Zealand participants to acquire
ERUs or CERs through Kyoto’s JI or CDM system and apply
them to meeting their domestic allowance. 232 The EU has been
less willing to grant ERUs or CERs direct transferability based
on concerns that the MRV procedures in place at the CDM
Executive Board or the JI Supervisory Committee are insufficient
to guarantee real and verifiable emissions reductions. If the EU
ends up keeping a separate registry for internal market trading,
it will make international carbon trading more difficult. A seller
seeking to enter the EU ETS market would have to demonstrate
that the credit was either a recognized NZU provided by the N.Z.
EPA or a Kyoto unit that meets the requirements of the EU
Commission. In addition, because the New Zealand system is
designed to adjust its allocation based on the five -year Kyoto
commitment period, any revision of the allocation allowances at
229.
230.
231.
232.

See discussion supra Part II.
Council Directive 2003/87, art. 21, 2003 O.J. (L 275) 32, 38 (EC).
Bullock, supra note 180, at 671.
Id.
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the end of the five-year period could mean retiring certain
allowances and adjusting the allowances held by all other
participants. This reorganization would make it extremely
difficult to allow international brokers to bank tradable credits or
engage in futures trading, both of which can improve the
efficiency of carbon markets if implemented properly. 233
The easiest solution to these issues is likely an implementing
agreement between the EU ETS and New Zealand ETS that
would clarify the transferability of credits. Such an agreement
would (1) specify the terms under which credits could be
transferred, including an official exchange rate for NZUs and EU
ETS emissions credits (assuming that the Commission does not
officially link its credits with Kyoto AAUs), (2) the type of market
activities permitted, (3) the proper registration procedures
tracking credit transfers, and (4) the bilateral recognition of
regulatory determinations made in both markets by the relevant
market regulatory authorities.234 Although both countries are
actively considering such an agreement, the EU Commission has
made it clear that New Zealand’s forestry offsets are incompatible
with the EU’s approach.235 The offsets encourage so-called
carbon arbitrage, whereby credits purchased outside of the EU
ETS flood the market, resulting in no net reduction in overall
emissions.
This problem could be solved through an
implementing agreement that either discounts New Zealand
credits or specifically identifies and prevents trading NZUs
earned through forestry offsets, but such an agreement would be

233. In fact, the EU has examined this problem extensively and concluded
that the Kyoto Protocol does not allow banking of AAUs beyond the legally
binding commitment period. It has approved the carry-over of certain CERs or
ERUs acquired through CDM or JI projects, but only up to a certain percentage
of a Member State’s NAP. DIRECTORATE GEN. ENV ’T & C LIMATE ACTION,
EUROPEAN COMM ’N, S TUDY ON THE INTEGRITY OF THE CLEAN DEVELOPMENT
M ECHANISM (2011).
234. “Authorities” is plural because the EU’s system will inevitably include
regulatory decisions made by national regulatory authorities.
235. Brian Fallow, NZ-Europe ETS link a long way off, says official, N.Z.
HERALD (Mar. 30, 2011), http://www.nzherald.co.nz/economy/news/article.
cfm?c_id=34&objectid= 10715758.
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politically difficult given the importance of the forestry program
to New Zealand’s government.236
The effectiveness of the harmonization approach is limited by
the political reality that adjusting hard-fought regulations to
accommodate market linkage may not be politically feasible. A
bilateral agreement between the EU ETS and the New Zealand
ETS could feasibly address the real differences in MRV
procedures that might prevent carbon trading. However, New
Zealand’s government is politically committed to a wider ETS,
which rewards certain domestic industries with financial benefits
in the form of generous carbon offsets. The EU ETS is less
capable of increasing market participation to include other
political sectors because of the limits of political agreement
between EU Member States. Ensuring compliance with EU
Commission Directives within the European Community has
proven far more difficult than was anticipated by early
Commission studies of the problem.237 In addition, Europol has
recently identified the manipulation of carbon trading as a key
avenue for organized crime in Europe, citing evidence that the
diversity of different regulatory approaches within the European
Community contributes to regulatory arbitrage by potential
criminals seeking to defraud energy trading markets. 238
VI.

TRANSNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
AUDITING STANDARDS

In an ideal world, the Kyoto Protocol’s agreed-upon
methodologies and technical definitions would establish
standards for each country’s carbon trading market. However, in
the absence of national commitments to universally adopt and
apply Kyoto standards, an alternative can be achieved through
transnational coordination of private parties. For example, the
International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB)
develops International Standards on Auditing (ISAs) that are
236. The EU Commission’s attitude is a bit disingenuous because the EU ETS
already permits ERUs earned through the CDM, which New Zealand’s forestry
participants could earn by applying to the CDM directly.
237. JON BIRGER S KJÆRSETH & JØRGEN WETTESTAD, EU EMISSIONS TRADING:
INITIATION, DECISION-MAKING AND IMPLEMENTATION 35, 58 (2008).
238. EUROPOL, ORGANISED CRIME AND ENERGY S UPPLY: S CENARIOS TO 2020 617 (2010).
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widely recognized as the premiere transnational standards in
financial auditing.239 The existence of ISAs on a wide variety of
accounting procedures has standardized the international
practice of financial accounting, while improving the
transparency of firms seeking to attract investors from a diversity
of different domestic regulatory structures. 240
A similar process would allow investors to develop confidence
in the monitoring and verification of emissions reductions
represented in either credits or offsets. An EU broker could then
have confidence that emissions offsets put together in New
Zealand would be based on similar technical standards. An
environmental transnational auditing standard could also be
flexible enough to incorporate the diversity of different
approaches to monitoring, reporting, and verifying carbon
emissions that are currently being developed in the various
regional markets.241 Those countries with the regulatory
capacity to establish national standards could work closely with
such a standard-setting agency to help develop best practices.
Firms in developing countries with little regulatory capacity
could use the international standards to increase transparency
and encourage partnerships through JIs or projects funded
through the CDM. A standards board could also allow the
regional trading markets in the United States to coordinate with
international markets without an EPA program in place. 242
Such private standards are already commonly employed to
certify carbon offsets in privately traded markets. For example,
the Verified Carbon Standard (VCS), formerly the Voluntary
Carbon Standard, was formed by a consortium of business and
environmental leaders to develop greater quality assurance for

239. Robert P. Delonis, International Financial Standards and Codes:
Mandatory Regulation Without Representation, 36 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 563,
591-93 (2004).
240. Joseph J. Norton, A “New International Financial Architecture?”-Reflections on the Possible Law-Based Dimension, 33 INT'L LAW. 891 (1999).
241. See Button, supra note 23.
242. See generally Steven Ferrey, Goblets of Fire: Potential Constitutional
Impediments to the Regulation of Global Warming, 35 ECOLOGY L.Q. 835 (2008)
(discussing regional trading market management initiatives in the absence of a
federal program).
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carbon offsets traded in voluntary carbon markets. 243 The VCS
standard is used to evaluate methodologies for measuring
reductions in carbon emissions from third-party participants.244
A potential methodology is submitted to the VCS, evaluated and
verified by an approved validation/verification body (VVB), and, if
the method is used in a project, the verified emissions reductions
are registered as Voluntary Carbon Units with a VCS-approved
registry.245 Unfortunately, the rigor of the VCS depends on the
validation of certain methodologies, which takes place through
third-party VVBs.246 VCS is not equipped to independently
approve third-party verifiers, so it relies on accreditation received
from either a GHG program recognized by the VCS, such as the
CDM, JI, or California’s Climate Action Reserve, or through
accreditation received from a member of the International
Accreditation Body under ISO 14065.247
The Gold Standard offers a similar certification, but limits its
third-party certification to only those verifiers recognized by an
UN-accredited auditor, such as a CDM’s DOE.248 Gold Standard
certification also involves more procedural certification, including
engagement with local stakeholders and a final review by the
Gold Standard’s own Technical Advisory Committee.249 The Gold
Standard also limits the approval of methodologies to those
recognized by the CDM, and a handful of other projects approved
by the Secretariat.250
The stricter methodologies limits
participation in the certification program, but has ensured that
more certified projects achieve intended reductions. The Chicago
Climate Exchange (CCX) also employs third-party verifiers, and
once again presumptively approves DOEs recognized by the
CDM.251
243. See Who We Are, V ERIFIED CARBON S TANDARD, http://v-c-s.org/who-we-are
(last visited Apr. 24, 2012).
244. Id.
245. V ERIFIED CARBON S TANDARD, V CS PROGRAM GUIDE 15-17 (2012).
246. Id.
247. Id. at 17-18.
248. THE GOLD S TANDARD, THE GOLD S TANDARD R EQUIREMENTS : V ERSION 2.2
22-23 (2012).
249. TAC & Rule Updates, THE GOLD S TANDARD, http://www.cdmgold
standard.org/project-certification/tac-update (last visited May 10, 2012).
250. THE GOLD S TANDARD, supra note 248, at 22.
251. CHI . CLIMATE EXCH., V ERIFICATION M ANUAL 6 (2011).
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EXPANDING MARKET LINKAGES THROUGH
THIRD-PARTY VERIFICATION OF
MONITORING AND REPORTING
PROCEDURES

Third-party verifiers are very much the backbone of carbon
trading markets. In the EU ETS, third-party verifiers are called
upon to independently assess and provide an opinion on the
quality and accuracy of operator’s annual emissions reports.252
EU operators are encouraged to consult third-party verifiers on
auditing control standards and ensuring the development of a
proper monitoring plan.253 Although New Zealand’s ETS
participants are not required to use third-party verification
unless they intend to use a unique emissions factor in their
calculation-based measurement methodology, most participants
elect to use third-party verifiers, and are encouraged to do so by
New Zealand’s EPA.254 The CDM depends heavily on third-party
verifiers for developing CDM-approved methodologies for various
offset projects and ensuring that emissions reductions are being
achieved.255 As a consequence, most voluntary standards also
depend on third-party verifiers because they rely so heavily on
CDM methodologies and require similar third-party auditing of
any voluntary carbon reduction project. 256
The three principle barriers to international trading of
carbon credits is the (1) lack of mutually acceptable
methodologies for measuring carbon emissions and reductions, (2)
differing methods for reporting, monitoring, and verifying
emission activities, and (3) variation in the number of
participating industries and emitters. Since third-party verifiers
already play such an important role in emission trading schemes,
it seems logical that third-party verifiers could also play an
important role in reducing the barriers to international carbon
trading. One option to address this problem is to create a
252. Commission Regulation 600/2012, 2012 O.J. (L 181) 1 (EC).
253. Id. at para. 15.
254. N.Z. REPORTING GUIDANCE , supra note 200, at 7.
255. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Nov. 28-Dec.
10, 2005, Report of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the
Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on its first session, ¶ 26-27, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.1 (Mar. 30, 2006).
256. See, e.g., THE GOLD S TANDARD, supra note 248, at 22-23.
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separate international body designed specifically to accredit
third-party verifiers, approve emission reduction methodologies,
and establish internationally recognized MRV procedures. An
international body designed and managed by national and
regional regulatory authorities could provide the foundation for
developing greater confidence in international carbon trading
markets.
Third-party verifiers are already involved in establishing
internationally recognized methodologies for calculating carbon
offsets. The CDM has approved a wide range of methodologies for
offset projects created by accredited DOEs. 257 The CDM relies
upon DOEs to develop standardized and replicable emission
measurement procedures for each project, which can then be
applied to similar projects by other participants.258 The CDM
process has been rightly criticized for failing to properly oversee
the accreditation of DOEs and the approval of methodologies with
dubious technical assumptions.259 In particular, the CDM is not
equipped to provide verification of emission reductions from each
project, especially for projects in countries without a strong
history of regulatory oversight. The CDM is also an inherently
political body, attached to the unhealthy dynamics of the
UNFCCC process. Even if the CDM were to develop a better
accreditation process and increase its MRV procedures, it is still
designed primarily as a tool for non-Annex I members.260 Its
primary concern is not establishing market confidence in tradable
emission credits.
An international body similar to the International
Accounting Standards Board (IASB) could address this problem
by formulating agreed upon rules and procedures for accrediting
third-party verifiers, evaluating methodologies for calculating
emission reductions, and verifying emissions through appropriate
monitoring and reporting requirements. Like the IASB, the
international body would consist of members of the private sector
engaged in international carbon trading, but would also include
national or regional authorities who regulate carbon markets.
257. See CDM Methodology Booklet, supra note 98.
258. Id.
259. See Michael Wara, Measuring the Clean Development Mechanism’s
Performance and Potential, 55 UCLA L. REV . 1759 (2008).
260. Id. at 1763 (discussing the strategic manipulation of CDM baselines).
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The organization’s goals would be to establish a rigorous
accreditation process for third-party verifiers such that if a
company met the body’s accreditation requirements it would be
recognized as a third-party verifier in all participating carbon
markets, as well as with the CDM. In addition, the body would
evaluate and approve methodologies for carbon offsets,
independent of the CDM, which, if approved, could be traded
internationally in all participating carbon markets. This would
provide a guarantee to any investor in a carbon offset project that
the credits would be able to be traded at a specified value in any
participating carbon markets. Finally, the body would maintain
approved MRV procedures, including appropriate calculationbased methods for various industrial processes, standards for
calibrating and maintaining continuous monitoring devices,
standards for record-keeping and reporting, and internal and
external review procedures, including standards for third-party
verification.261
VIII. CONCLUSION
The collapse of the UNFCCC’s Kyoto Protocol has created a
chaotic international regulatory environment that threatens to
undermine confidence in newly formed, or forming, carbon
trading markets. Rather than wait for the international
environment to improve, an alternative approach is to encourage
internationally recognized environmental auditing standards that
would allow the transnational coordination of trading markets
and improve the transparency of carbon credits and offsets.
Although potentially difficult to establish, such standards could
serve to fill in the gaps left by the failed Kyoto Protocol, allowing
countries with the political will to move forward without waiting
for a consensus-based process.
An international body similar to the IASB could facilitate
international carbon trading by setting standards for the
accreditation for third-party verifiers, evaluating and approving

261. Although ISO 14065:2007 provides international standards for validating
and verifying carbon emissions, and various other technical bodies have similar
standards, an international body could facilitate the harmonization of carbon
markets by adopting standards that would be mutually recognized by each
member’s national regulatory authority.
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methodologies for calculating carbon emissions and reductions
from offsets, and coordinating the harmonization of technical
standards for MRV procedures. Although not a replacement for
the Kyoto Protocol’s carbon trading mechanisms, an independent
international body formed by private parties engaged in carbon
trading and by national and regional authorities that regulate
carbon markets could provide investors and financial
intermediaries with an assurance that a carbon credit purchased
in one market can be readily traded with another market without
the risk that the regulating authority will refuse to recognize its
validity. This would improve the functioning of carbon markets
by increasing market efficiency, allowing firms to recognize
greater benefits from participating in emission trading schemes.
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